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Abstract 
Sharing platforms such as zilok.com enable sharing of durable goods among consumers, and seek to 
maximize profits by charging transaction-based platform fees. We develop a model in which 
consumers who have heterogeneous needs concerning the use of a durable good decide whether to 
purchase and share (i.e., be a lender) or borrow (i.e., be a borrower), and a monopoly sharing platform 
determines the platform fees. We find, first, that consumers with greater need to use a durable good 
purchase and share, and that consumers with lesser need borrow. Second, sharing platforms 
maximize profits only if the supply of a durable good matches demand—that is, the market must 
clear in order for platform fees to be profit maximizing. Third, the market-clearing condition requires 
lender and borrower fees are classic strategic complements. Fourth, to maintain the market-clearing 
condition, sharing platforms have to increase their lender fee or decrease their borrower fee in 
response to increases in the sharing price, increases in usage capacity, and decreases in the purchase 
price of a durable good, and vice versa. These findings indicate that commonly applied one-sided 
pricing models in sharing platforms can be improved. 
Keywords: Sharing Economy, Sharing Platforms, Durable Goods, Consumer Behavior, Platform 
Pricing Behavior. 
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1 Introduction 
Consumers own a substantial amount of underutilized 
durable goods. For instance, in the U.S., consumers 
own approximately 50 million power drills, which are 
used on average only six to thirteen minutes until they 
are replaced (Botsman & Rogers, 2010). Granting 
other consumers access to the unused capacity of 
durable goods represents the underlying idea in the 
emerging consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing 
economy. The sharing economy is expected to grow to 
$335 billion by 2025 (PwC, 2015). This rise is mainly 
driven by consumers who increasingly favor paying 
for temporary access to durable goods instead of 
buying and owning them (Dervojeda et al., 2013) and 
by C2C sharing platforms such as zilok.com, which 
enable the distribution of excess capacity of 
underutilized durable goods by giving consumers the 
opportunity to share them. 
The C2C sharing market is characterized by four 
classes of participants (cf., Dervojeda et al., 2013). 
First are producers or retailers that sell (durable) goods 
to consumers and charge a purchase price. Next, 
lenders are consumers that purchase goods and grant 
other consumers temporary access to this good by 
charging a sharing price. On the other hand, borrowers 
are consumers that do not purchase, but aim to get 




temporary access to a durable good by paying a sharing 
price. Finally, sharing platforms are accessibility-
based systems that provide mediating services 
enabling sharing transactions between lenders and 
borrowers and can charge platform fees to both groups. 
Figure 1 illustrates the participants and their interplay 
in the C2C sharing market. 
In the context of a C2C sharing market, we consider 
the commercial sharing of durable goods such as a 
power drill which is enabled by a C2C sharing  
platform such as Zilok.com. In our model lenders and 
borrowers maximize utility, the sharing platform 
maximizes profit, and we take the purchase price of the 
good from the producer or retailer as given. To make 
our analysis concrete, we use the example of sharing a 
power drill through a sharing platform such as 
Zilok.com as a running example throughout. 
 
  
Figure 1. C2C Sharing Market 
The objective of C2C sharing platforms is to enable 
sharing transactions and maximizing profits by 
charging a transaction-based platform fee to lenders 
and/or a transaction-based platform fee to borrowers. 
It is not sufficient to simply set optimal platform fees 
once. Rather, sharing platforms have to be aware of 
changes in external factors (i.e., factors that sharing 
platforms are not accountable for). Such external 
factors include the purchase price, which is set by 
producers or retailers, the sharing price, which is set by 
the lender, and the usage capacity (capacity hereafter) of 
a durable good, which can be influenced by the lender 
through repairing or replacing worn parts representing 
investments in capacity. Changes in these external factors 
may influence supply and demand and require consequent 
responses in the platform fees. 
Our analysis and running example refer only to the 
C2C sharing part of zilok.com. There are other forms 
of sharing that our analysis does not cover. We do not 
consider altruistic sharing, commodity exchange, and 
gift-giving among family members and friends (Belk, 
2010). Our focus is separate from the sharing of 
perishable goods such as food (e.g., provided by 
olioex.com), intangible goods such as services (e.g., 
transportation provided by uber.com), and digital 
goods such as music (e.g., provided by spotify.com). 
In addition, our focus is separate from luxury goods 
because consumers are typically not willing to share 
expensive and valuable goods. We also do not consider 
business-to-consumer (B2C) sharing enabled by B2C 
sharing platforms such as car2go.com. 
Accordingly, we address the following research 
question: What is the optimal pricing behavior of C2C 
sharing platforms to maximize profits in response to 
changes in external factors? 
To answer our research question, we develop a two-
stage model. In the first stage, a monopoly sharing 
platform maximizes profits by setting prices in a two-
sided market structure (cf., Armstrong, 2006; Rochet 
& Tirole, 2006; Rysman, 2009). In the second stage, 
we analyze the behavior of consumers that differ in 
their need to use a durable good, whereby consumers 
decide whether to purchase and share (i.e., be a lender) 
or borrow (i.e., be a borrower) to maximize their net 
utility (cf., Becker, 1976). In using this two-stage 




formulation, we are in line with Knote and Blohm 
(2016), who identified the understanding of multisided 
principles and pricing models of sharing platforms as 
the most important knowledge gaps in understanding 
the sharing economy. An innovation embedded in our 
formulation is that consumers decide which side of the 
market they are on as part of our model. This is a 
departure from most of the two-sided market literature, 
in which the participants on the two sides are 
predetermined. 
Our analysis yields a series of results. We find, first, 
that consumers with a greater need to use a durable 
good purchase and share, and consumers with a lesser 
need to use borrow that good. Second, sharing 
platforms maximize profits only if the supply of a 
durable good matches demand—that is, the market 
must clear in order for platform fees to be profit-
maximizing. Third, the market-clearing condition 
requires that lender and borrower fees are classic 
strategic complements. Fourth, to maintain the market-
clearing condition, sharing platforms have to increase 
their lender fee or decrease their borrower fee in 
response to increases in the sharing price, increases in 
capacity, and decreases in the purchase price of a 
durable good, and vice versa. These findings indicate 
that commonly applied one-sided pricing models of 
sharing platforms can be improved. 
We structure our work as follows: We begin by 
discussing the related literature to position our research 
question. Next, we define our notation and explain our 
assumptions. Subsequently, we solve our two-stage 
model in reverse order by first analyzing consumer 
behavior and then analyzing optimal pricing behavior by 
a monopoly sharing platform. Finally, we conclude by 
presenting managerial implications and discussing 
implications for future research. 
2 Related Literature 
We structure this section according to our analysis 
sequence by first discussing articles that investigate 
consumer behavior in the sharing economy and then 
discussing articles that analyze sharing platform 
behavior. Of course, there are articles that address 
other aspects of the sharing economy, such as the 
consequences of the sharing economy on 
traditional firms (e.g., Cusumano, 2015; Malhotra 
& Van Alstyne, 2014; Zervas, Proserpio, & Byers, 
2014). We do not cover this literature as it is 
unrelated to our model and contribution. 
2.1 Consumer Behavior  
Belk (2007) argues that sharing can foster 
communities, save resources, and create synergies for 
consumers. Furthermore, in describing cost savings as 
the main motive, the article draws a comparison to 
companies that increasingly outsource operations in 
order to lower costs, and argues that, for similar 
reasons, consumers will increasingly share their owned 
goods to reduce their total costs of ownership. 
Botsman and Rogers (2010) also argue that bedsides 
the advantage to consumers of saving money, sharing 
lowers environmental damage and encourages the 
development of better products. Phipps et al. (2013) 
introduce a conceptual framework based on social 
cognitive theory, and argue that besides saving money, 
consumers receive further benefits from the sharing 
economy, such as community building of like-minded 
people and the emergence of sustainable spaces to 
meet. Sundararajan (2016) depicts a broad and 
visionary picture of the sharing economy as “crowd-
based capitalism,” making the point that sharing will 
lead to higher utilization of product capacity and that 
the complex microstructure of the sharing economy 
requires a set of models. Moehlmann (2015) studies 
data from airbnb.com and finds that the likelihood of 
choosing a sharing option is predominantly determined 
by users’ self-benefit and cost savings, whereas 
environmental considerations are negligible. Bearing 
in mind the different motives that drive consumers to 
participate in the sharing economy, we focus on cost 
savings since this is the most widely agreed upon 
reason for participating in the C2C sharing market. 
Matzner, Chasin, and Todenhoefer (2015) present an 
empirical study based on the theory of planned 
behavior in which they represent lenders and 
borrowers as part of the same consumer group and 
acknowledge that consumers can independently decide 
how they participate in the C2C sharing market. We 
follow this view of consumers in our model whereby 
consumers choose whether to lend or borrow 
endogenously. Chen (2009) empirically studies the 
needs and perceived values of art consumers and finds 
that art collectors and exhibit visitors differ in their need 
to consume art leading to different consumer groups 
namely, ownership for the art collector and access for the 
exhibit visitor. Accordingly, we consider consumers who 
differ in their need to use a durable good, and our model 
confirms Chen’s (2009) finding that consumers with 
greater need aim to own rather than simply access a 
durable good.  
Lamberton and Rose (2012) draw from three different 
studies and empirically find that the rational consumer 
utility model is applicable to commercial sharing. 
Thus, we use rational consumer behavior to inform our 
model. Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015) build a 
theoretical model for peer-to-peer sharing of durable 
goods in which consumers are also allowed to trade 
their durable goods through secondary markets. They 
calibrate their model with data from the U.S. 
automobile industry and transaction data of the car 
sharing platform getaround.com. The results show a 
decrease in ownership but increase in utilization and 
consumer welfare due to the availability of a sharing 




market: below-median-income consumers have a 
significantly higher improvement in welfare and also 
provide a majority of the sharing supply. Mueller 
(2014) theorizes about the behavior of consumers 
participating in the C2C sharing market and considers 
consumers that are heterogeneous in the value gained 
from using a durable good. We adopt this model setup 
as our starting point, and analyze the implications of 
consumer behavior on platform pricing behavior. 
2.2 Platform Behavior  
Einav, Farronanto, and Levin (2016) find that 
successful platforms need to set the sharing price to 
balance demand and supply. They argue that auctions 
may be suitable because they allow prices to respond 
to market conditions, but also that consumers tend to 
be less interested in auctions now than they were 
fifteen years ago. As a result, Einav et al. (2016) call 
for simpler pricing mechanisms that make use of 
available information that can electively substitute for 
auctions. Moreover, on most sharing platforms, the 
sharing price is set by the lender rather than the 
platform. In contrast to Einav et al. (2016), we analyze 
and find pricing mechanisms for platform fees instead 
of the sharing price to balance supply and demand for 
maximizing profit. Weber (2014) analyzes how a 
sharing platform can eliminate moral hazard between 
lenders and borrowers. In the collaborative housing 
market, where heterogeneous borrowers and vertically 
differentiated lenders (in terms of housing quality) can 
use airbnb.com as a sharing platform to increase 
matching probability, the sharing platform offers a 
form of insurance that requires borrowers to make a 
deposit and gives lenders the ability to file claims if 
damage occurs. Weber (2014) assumes that the sharing 
platform, in turn, charges symmetric platform fees to 
lenders and borrowers for the mediating services, and 
finds that if all participants are risk neutral, then the 
sharing platform can cover all lenders’ claims while 
providing incentives to borrowers to behave as lenders 
would if they were using their own space. 
The literature discussed above is summarized in Table 
1 according to content and method. 




Consumer behavior Platform behavior 
Descriptive/conceptual 
Belk (2007)  
Botsman & Rogers (2010)  
Phipps et al. (2013)  
Sundararajan (2016) 
Einav et al. (2016) 
Empirical 
Moehlmann (2015)  
Matzner et al. (2015)  
Chen (2009)  
Lamberton & Rose (2012)  
 
Theoretical Fraiberger & Sundararajan (2015) Mueller (2014) Weber (2014) 
Our literature review on the sharing economy found 
that consumer behavior is investigated more 
extensively than platform behavior—only Weber 
(2014) theoretically analyzes platform behavior as we 
do in the context of a C2C sharing market. In contrast 
to that work, our formulation presumes potentially 
asymmetric platform fees, which allows us to 
operationalize the concept of subsidizing one side over 
the other, which is common in the two-sided platforms 
literature (cf., Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Eisenmann, 
Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Rysman, 2009). 
Moreover, we focus on the directional changes in 
platform pricing as a response to changing external 
factors, such as changes in the durable good’s purchase 
price and capacity. Our model further applies to C2C 
sharing platforms for durable goods in general and 
abstracts from a specific platform or product. We 
further abstract from specific utility functions, using a 
reduced-form utility function for lenders and 
borrowers, allowing us to develop more general 
results. In doing so, we show how sharing platforms can 
dynamically maximize profits by adapting their platform 
fees based on changes in external factors. 
The structure of our model is related to that of Brock 
and Evans (1985) in which individual entrepreneurs 
make production decisions and a policy maker decides 
on a tax schedule to maximize welfare. Our model is 
also related to studies by Nault (1996) and Levi and 
Nault (2004) in which firms decide whether to convert 
to a new technology and a policy maker offers different 
tax regimes that impact firms’ choices of whether to 
convert. The essential differences in our model are that 
we have consumers that decide on whether to purchase 
and share, or borrow a durable good, rather than firms 
that decide between technologies. Moreover, we 
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consider a sharing platform that decides on platform 
fees to maximize profits instead of a policy maker that 
decides on tax schedules. Finally, and most 
importantly, we consider a two-sided market, where 
differing platform fees can be charged to lenders and 
to borrowers. 
Two-sided markets are usually characterized by strong 
network externalities, which in a winner-take-all 
setting often result in a monopoly platform (cf., 
Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rysman, 2009). Accordingly, 
we treat the sharing platform as a monopoly in our 
model, and abstract from the conditions that may have 
led to the platform being a monopoly. A monopoly 
setting is reasonable because two-sided platforms do 
not face diminishing returns when growing beyond a 
certain point as lenders usually benefit from a large 
number of borrowers and vice versa. This leads to 
winner-take-all market consolidations featuring a single 
platform that serves almost the entire market. Such 
market consolidations have taken place in other two-
sided markets such as online social networking with 
Facebook, online auctions with eBay, and web search 
with Google being the dominant platforms (Eisenmann 
et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, the challenge for two-sided platforms to 
be successful is to get both sides of the market (in our 
case, borrowers and lenders) on board (Rochet & 
Tirole, 2006). This can be achieved by platform pricing 
behavior that accounts for externalities on both sides. 
Pricing in two-sided markets includes the opportunity 
of (relative) subsidizing one side over the other (cf., 
Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; 
Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rysman, 2009). Such pricing 
strategies can compensate different price elasticities 
(Rysman, 2009) and different numbers of participants 
on both sides (Eisenmann et al., 2006), consequently 
impacting overall transaction volume and platform 
profits (Lee & Wu 2009). In our model, we allow for 
asymmetric pricing as well as different price 
elasticities for supply and demand of a durable good. 
3 Notation and Assumptions 
Our assumptions pertain to a number of different 
factors relating to consumer heterogeneity, 
consumer utility, and platform fees.  
We consider consumers that participate in the C2C 
sharing market. For these consumers, it is 
economically worthwhile to either purchase and share 
or borrow a durable good. We exclude consumers that 
are willing neither to purchase nor to borrow a durable 
good or who prefer outside options such as face-to-
face sharing between friends and family members 
or other alternatives. Our first assumption concerns 
those consumers that participate in the C2C sharing 
market. 
Assumption 1: Consumer heterogeneity: Consumers 
differ in their need to use a durable good. 
Consistent with Alba et al. (1997), we assume that 
consumers are heterogeneous in their need to use a 
durable good and denote consumers as 𝜃𝜃 , which is 
normalized in the interval [0,1]. Thus, 𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃) > 0 ∀ 𝜃𝜃 ∈
[0,1],𝐹𝐹(0) = 0  and 𝐹𝐹(1) = 1 . 𝜃𝜃  represents an 
increasing need to use a durable good, such that 
consumers with 𝜃𝜃  = 0 are those with the lowest 
need, and consumers with 𝜃𝜃 = 1 are those with the 
greatest need. 𝜃𝜃 is taken to be uniformly distributed 
over its range. This incurs little loss of generality as 
𝜃𝜃 can be scaled as needed. 
In our running example of sharing a power drill, a 
consumer with a greater need to use a power drill (high 
𝜃𝜃) could be an individual that enjoys artisanal work at 
home (handy-person hereafter). A consumer with less 
need to use a power drill (low 𝜃𝜃)  could be an 
individual that dislikes doing artisanal work at home 
(non-handy-person hereafter). 
The amount of time consumers aim to use a durable 
good is denoted by 𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0, ?̅?𝑥] with the subscript L for 
the own usage time of lenders and with the subscript B 
for the demand usage time of borrowers. The amount 
of time a lender aims to share a durable good is called 
supplied usage time and is denoted by 𝑦𝑦 ∈ [0, ?̅?𝑥]. As 
borrowers would typically maximize the usage of a 
durable good in the available time, the amount of time 
a lender actually shares a durable good (i.e., shared 
usage time) is equal to the actual usage time of the 
durable good by borrowers. Otherwise, borrowers 
would just be paying for the availability of the durable 
good without using it. 𝑥𝑥  and 𝑦𝑦  are bounded from 
below, because using a durable good for a negative 
time is infeasible; they are bounded from above by the 
durable good’s usage capacity ?̅?𝑥. For example, a power 
drill typically fails after a specific number of operating 
hours. The durable good considered for sharing in our 
model is homogeneous (not vertically differentiated) 
and represents the best economic choice with a 
minimum price/performance ratio (𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃/?̅?𝑥)  out of 
different products of a product type such as power 
drills. This means that a consumer would decide 
whether to purchase and share or borrow the power 
drill with the best ratio between purchase price and 
capacity. 
The monetary utility of a consumer depends on the 
need to use a durable good, 𝜃𝜃, and the usage time 𝑥𝑥 
(i.e., own usage time, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , for lenders or demanded 
usage time, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵, for borrowers). We denote this utility 
by a reduced-form utility function 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥), which is 
bounded from below 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 0) = 0 . We take a 
consumer’s utility as increasing in the need to use a 
durable good, and increasing and concave in the usage 
time to its capacity ?̅?𝑥. The latter represents the standard 
assumption of decreasing marginal utility. 










> 0, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
< 0.  
For example, the utility gained from using a power drill 
is higher for a handy-person as compared to a non-
handy-person. Moreover, the utility from using a 
power drill increases in the usage time while the 
marginal utility from using the power drill decreases 
because a consumer typically drills the more important 
holes before the less important ones and the drill wears 
out through usage.  
Given the nature of the consumer’s utility function, 
there is a relationship between the usage time and the 
consumer’s need to use a durable good. This cross-
effect is fundamental to the results in that a consumer’s 
marginal utility is increases with the need to use a 
durable good. 




For our example, this means that a handy-person 
experiences a higher marginal utility from using a 
power drill than a non-handy-person. 
Consumers in the C2C sharing market can either 
purchase and share, or borrow a durable good. Lenders 
purchase a durable good for a purchase price, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+, 
and charge borrowers a sharing price per unit of shared 
usage time, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+. 
The mediating services to connect lenders and 
borrowers are provided by a monopoly sharing 
platform (e.g., Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rysman, 2009). 
The monopoly platform is limited to intermediation: it 
does not compete with traditional firms outside the 
domain of sharing such as is the case with airbnb.com 
that competes with the hotel industry. As stated earlier, 
we consider consumers for whom participating in the 
C2C sharing market is economically worthwhile, and 
for these consumers there is no alternative C2C sharing 
platform on which they could share a durable good. 
Assumption 4: Platform fees: The monopoly sharing 
platform sets nonnegative transaction-based 
platform fees to lenders and borrowers. 
To maximize profits, the sharing platform sets a 
transaction-based lender fee, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆] , and a 
transaction-based borrower fee,  𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃]  (cf., 
Armstrong, 2006). The lender fee is limited by 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 
because with a lender fee greater than the sharing price, 
no lender would have an incentive to share a durable 
good. The borrower fee is limited by 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 because with 
a borrower fee greater than the purchase price, all 
borrowers would purchase the durable good. These 
weakly positive transaction-based fees allow for 
subsidizing one group over the other to compensate 
different numbers of lenders and borrowers and 
different price elasticities (cf., Caillaud & Jullien, 
2003; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rysman, 2009). We do 
not allow for negative fees (i.e., subsidizing lenders 
and/or borrowers for making sharing transactions via 
the sharing platform) because the sharing platform 
must cover fixed costs 𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+  for providing the 
mediating services and we do not observe any sharing 
platform operating in the sharing market that currently 
charges negative fees. This indicates that sharing 
platforms have to generate revenue from charging 
positive platform fees,  𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 + 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∈ 𝑅𝑅+ , in order to be 
profitable. 
In practice, sharing platforms charge a percent-of-
value lender fee and/or a percent-of-value borrower 
fee, which represent a percentage rate of the total 
sharing price (𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ min {𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵} in our model). Hence, 
in such implemented pricing models, platform fees 
increase in the sharing price and in the shared usage 
time. In contrast, as our basic pricing model, we 
intentionally use unit transaction fees, which only 
increase in the shared usage time. We do this in order 
to examine whether commonly applied percent-of-
value platform fees are profit maximizing or whether 
they can be replaced by a better pricing model. 
4 Model Set-Up 
We set up our C2C sharing market model as a two-
stage model. In the first stage, the monopoly sharing 
platform sets transaction-based platform fees to 
borrowers and lenders. In the second stage, consumers 
maximize their net utility by deciding to be a lender or 
a borrower based on their individual needs and the 
resulting expected own or demanded usage time of a 
durable good. In our two-stage model, we work 
backwards and examine consumer behavior first and 
platform pricing second. 
4.1 Consumer Behavior 
4.1.1 Borrowers 
For a borrower, the net utility 𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵  includes the 
sharing price paid to the lender and the borrower fee 
paid to the sharing platform: 
𝜙𝜙𝐵𝐵 = 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵) − 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 − 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 > 0,  (1) 
where we subscript the borrower-specific variables 
with 𝐵𝐵. We take 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 > 0) is sufficiently large to 
make (1) positive for all borrowers. Otherwise, 
borrowers would not borrow and consequently not 
participate in the C2C sharing market. For 
borrowers, the first-order condition by choice of 
demanded usage time is 
 








– 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 − 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 = 0
= 𝜔𝜔(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵), 
(2) 
where 𝜔𝜔(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵) implicitly defines the optimal 
value function 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵). Lemma 1 describes the 
behavior of 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵). 
Lemma 1: For borrowers, the demanded usage time is 
increasing in their need to use a durable good and is 
decreasing in the sharing price and the borrower fee. 
Proof: From Assumption 3, we have 






The sign of the second-order condition follows directly 
from Assumption 2 and is 










𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)/𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃








𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆








𝜕𝜕𝜔𝜔(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵






In our running example Lemma 1 implies that a handy-
person (high 𝜃𝜃) that borrows a power drill aims to use 
the drill for a longer time compared to a borrower that 
dislikes artisanal work (low 𝜃𝜃 ). Moreover, borrowers 
increase their demanded usage time with a decreasing 
sharing price and a decreasing borrower fee they have to 
pay when borrowing a power drill. 
The effects on 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 in the proof of Lemma 1 represent the 
borrowers’ individual elasticities of demand for sharing a 
durable good. We refer to these elasticities later. 
4.1.2 Lenders 
For a lender, the net utility 𝜙𝜙𝐿𝐿  includes the sharing 
price received from the borrower, the lender fee paid 
to the sharing platform, and the purchase price paid to 
own the durable good: 
𝜙𝜙𝐿𝐿 = 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿) + 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 > 0,   (3) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.   𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑦𝑦 ≤ 𝑥𝑥,�  
where we subscript the lender-specific variables with 
𝐿𝐿 . We take 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 > 0) to be sufficiently large so 
that, together with 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑦𝑦, (3)  is positive for all 
lenders. Otherwise, lenders would not purchase and 
share a durable good, and consequently would not 
participate in the C2C sharing market. In order to 
maximize the net utility subject to the inequality 
constraint by choice of the two independent variables 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿  and 𝑦𝑦, we apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
theorem (cf., Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004). The 
Lagrange function and its first-order conditions are 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃,𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿) + 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃






−  𝜆𝜆1,   (4) 
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦
= 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 − 𝜆𝜆1,  (5) 




= 0, (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦
= 0,         
(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑦𝑦 ≤ ?̅?𝑥;  𝜆𝜆1 ≥ 0; 𝜆𝜆1[𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑦𝑦 − ?̅?𝑥] = 0.  
Lemma 2 describes the extent by which the capacity of 
a durable good is exploited by lenders. 
Lemma 2: Lenders fully exploit the usage capacity of 
a durable good to maximize their net utility. 
Proof: To find a solution we consider whether the 
constraint in (3) is binding. Suppose 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑦𝑦 < ?̅?𝑥. From 
KKT condition (iii) it follows that 𝜆𝜆1 = 0 and from 
Assumption 2 it follows that 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿/𝜕𝜕 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 > 0. 
Consequently, KKT condition (i) is violated. Now 
suppose 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + 𝑦𝑦 = ?̅?𝑥 . From KKT condition (iii) it 
follows that  𝜆𝜆1 > 0. Consequently, KKT condition 
(i) and (ii) can be fulfilled and this case represents a 
valid solution. Q.E.D. 
In our running example Lemma 2 means that lenders 
of a power drill maximize their net utility if they either 
use or share their power drill to its capacity (or until 
the power drill breaks). 
Setting (4) and (5) to zero, rearranging (5) and 
inserting into (4) we have 






− [𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] = 0
= 𝜓𝜓(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿),   
(6) 
where 𝜓𝜓(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)  implicitly defines the optimal 
value function 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿). Lemma 3 describes the 
behavior of 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿). 
Lemma 3: For lenders, the own usage time is 
increasing in their need to use a durable good, 
decreasing in the sharing price, and increasing in 
the lender fee. 
Proof: From Assumption 2 we have 






From Assumption 3 we have 










𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃








𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆








𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓(𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿






In our running example Lemma 3 implies that a handy-
person (high 𝜃𝜃) that purchases and shares a power drill, 
uses the drill for a longer time than a non-handy-person 
(low 𝜃𝜃). Moreover, lenders increase their own usage 
time of the power drill with a lower sharing price they 
receive from the borrowers and with a greater lender 
fee. 
In order to determine the optimal supplied usage time, 
we use Lemma 2 and (6) to get 




+ [𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] − 𝑦𝑦 = 0
= 𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿), (7) 
where 𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿) implicitly defines the optimal 
value function 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿). Lemma 4 describes the 
behavior of 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥,𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿). 
Lemma 4: For lenders, the supplied usage time is 
decreasing in their need to use a durable good, is 
decreasing with the lender fee, is increasing with 
the sharing price, and is increasing with 
capacity. 
Proof: From Assumption 3 we have 










𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃








𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑥








𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆








𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿






In our running example, Lemma 4 implies that a non-
handy-person (low 𝜃𝜃) aims to share their own power 
drill for a longer time than a handy-person (high 𝜃𝜃). 
Moreover, lenders increase their supplied usage time 
with higher power drill capacity, with a higher sharing 
price they receive from borrowers, and with a lower 
lender fee paid to the sharing platform. 
The effects on 𝑦𝑦 in the proof of Lemma 4 represent the 
lenders’ individual elasticities of supply for sharing a 
durable good. We refer to these elasticities later. 
4.1.3 Indifferent consumer 
Consumers maximize their net utility by deciding whether to 
purchase and share or borrow a durable good. That is, 
max {𝑈𝑈�𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿)� + 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿) − 
𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿) − 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 
𝑈𝑈�𝜃𝜃, 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)� − 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵) − 
 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)}. 
We use Lemma 2 to substitute 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿�  with ?̅?𝑥 −
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿� and identify the consumer that is indifferent 
between purchasing and sharing, and borrowing, 𝜃𝜃,�  by  
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𝑈𝑈 �𝜃𝜃,� 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿�� + 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
∗ �?̅?𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿�� 
− 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∗ �?̅?𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿�� − 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 
− 𝑈𝑈 �𝜃𝜃,� 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵�� + 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵� + 
𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵� = 0 







where 𝛬𝛬�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵�  implicitly defines the 
indifferent consumer 𝜃𝜃(�𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥,𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵) . We use (∙) 
for (𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)  in the following arguments to 
simplify and shorten our notation. 
Our first theorem defines the separation of consumers into 
those that borrow and those that purchase and share. 
Theorem 1: Consumers with a greater need purchase 
and share (i.e., are lenders), and consumers with 
a lesser need borrow (i.e., are borrowers). 




𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 �𝜃𝜃,� 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿��
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�
+ 
































Rearranging and cancelling terms and using the 




𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 �𝜃𝜃,� 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿��
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�
−
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈 �𝜃𝜃,� 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵��
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�
. (9) 
From Assumption 2, it follows that both terms on the 
right hand side of (9) are positive. For 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 = 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 = 0, the 
first term equals the second term and consequently (9) 
equals zero. We excluded this case from our analysis 
directly after Assumption 4 because the platform 
would not cover its fixed cost. Starting from 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 = 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 =
0  and using Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, a marginal 
increase of 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 results in a marginal decrease of 
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵) and a marginal increase of 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 results in a 
marginal increase of 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿� . The resulting 
difference 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿� − 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)  is positive. 
Treating this difference as small, 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿� −
𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃,� 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)  represents a marginal increase in 𝑥𝑥 . 
Thus, (9) represents the change in the marginal utility 
with an increasing need to use of the indifferent 
consumer which can be rewritten as 𝜕𝜕𝛬𝛬/𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃� =
𝜕𝜕2𝑈𝑈(𝜃𝜃�, 𝑥𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃� . This term is positive from 
Assumption 3. Q.E.D. 
In our running example, Theorem 1 implies that 
consumers with a lesser need to use a power drill 
borrow and consumers with a greater need purchase 
and share the power drill. 
Lemma 5 determines the effects of the purchase 
price, the platform fees, the sharing price, and 
capacity on the indifferent consumer. 
Lemma 5: The proportion of borrowers increases in 
the purchase price, decreases in the borrower 
fee, increases in the lender fee, decreases in the 
sharing price, and decreases in capacity. 
Proof: Using Lemma 2 and totally differentiating (8) 
with respect to 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, and ?̅?𝑥, cancelling terms, 
using the optimality conditions of (2) and (6), and 














































From Theorem 1, the denominators of the five 
equations above are positive. Consequently, the first 
equation is positive and the second equation is 
negative. From the domain of 𝑥𝑥 ∈[0, ?̅?𝑥] , it follows that 
the third equation is positive and the fourth equation is 
negative. From the domain of 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∈[0, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆] , it follows 
that the fifth equation is negative. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5 explains how external factors influence the 
number of lenders and borrowers of a durable good 
(cf., first, fourth, and fifth equation in the proof of 




Lemma 5), and how the sharing platform can influence 
the number of lenders and borrowers by adapting its 
platform fees (cf., second and third equation in the 
proof of Lemma 5). 
4.2 Platform Pricing Behavior 
As stated earlier, the monopoly sharing platform sets a 
borrower fee 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 and a lender fee 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿, to be paid to the 
sharing platform for each transaction between 
borrowers and lenders. The aggregate shared usage 
time represents the minimum of aggregate demand of 
all borrowers and aggregate supply of all lenders. 
Using Theorem 1, aggregate demand is represented by 




and aggregate supply is represented by 
𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) = � 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
1
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃. 
The sharing platform also faces fixed costs, C, for 
setting up the platform. Consequently, the profit 
function of the sharing platform is 
𝜋𝜋 = min{𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥),
𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)}[𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] − 𝐶𝐶 
Based on this profit function we can state the profit 
maximization problem for two cases. 
Case 1: For the case in which aggregate supply is 
greater than or equal to aggregate demand, the profit 





{𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) ∗ [𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿]
− 𝐶𝐶}, (10) 
s.t.  𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) ≤  𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥). 
In order to maximize the sharing platform’s profit by 
choice of the platform fees  𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 and 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿, we again use the 
theorem KKT theorem. The Lagrange function and its 
first-order conditions are 
𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥 = � 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
0
, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃 ∗ [𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] − 
𝜆𝜆1 �� 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
0
, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃 − � 𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
1
𝜃𝜃�(∙)




= � 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
0
, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃 + 
















+ 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵






= � 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
0
, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃 + [𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿]










+ 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿












(iii) 𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)
≤ 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥);  𝜆𝜆1 ≥ 0; 
 𝜆𝜆1[𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)
− 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)]
= 0. 
Lemma 6. In Case 1, a monopoly sharing platform 
only maximizes profits by setting the platform 
fees in a way that aggregate demand equals 
aggregate supply. 
Proof: To find a solution we consider if the constraint 
in (10) is binding. Suppose  𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃,𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) <
𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥):  From KKT condition (iii) 
follows 𝜆𝜆1 = 0. From Lemma 5 follows that (12) is 
positive. Consequently, we have 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 > 0  and 
KKT condition (ii) is violated. 
Now suppose 𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) =
 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃,𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥): From KKT condition (iii) it follows 
𝜆𝜆1 > 0 . Consequently, KKT condition (i) and (ii) can be 
fulfilled and this case represents a valid solution. Q.E.D. 
Case 2: For the case in which aggregate supply is 
lower than or equal to aggregate demand, the profit 
maximization problem is given by 







{𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)
∗  [𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] − 𝐶𝐶}, 
(13) 
s.t.  𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) ≤  𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥). 
As in Case 1, we use the KKT theorem. The Lagrange 
function and its first-order conditions are 
𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 = � 𝑦𝑦� 𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿,, ?̅?𝑥�
1
𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃 ∗ [𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿]







, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵)𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃� − 𝐶𝐶, 
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵




[𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿] ∗ 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿,, ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵







− 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵


























𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃   
− 𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿












(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) ≤ 𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥);  𝜆𝜆1
≥ 0; 
          𝜆𝜆1[𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) − 𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)]
= 0. 
Lemma 7: In Case 2, a monopoly sharing platform 
only maximizes profits by setting the platform 
fees in a way that aggregate demand equals 
aggregate supply. 
Proof: To find a solution we consider if the constraint 
in (13) is binding. Suppose 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) <
𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) : From KKT condition (iii) it 
follows 𝜆𝜆1 = 0. From Lemma 5 it follows that (14) is 
positive. Consequently, we have 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 > 0  and 
KKT condition (i) is violated. 
Now suppose 𝑌𝑌(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥) =
𝑋𝑋(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥): From KKT condition (iii) it follows 
𝜆𝜆1 > 0 . Consequently, KKT condition (i) and (ii) can be 
fulfilled and this case represents a valid solution. Q.E.D. 
Combining Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, we find that a 
sharing platform has to set the platform fees in a 
way that the market clears, in other words, to 
maximize profits platform fees have to be set so 
that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. 
We identify the platform fees that result in such a 
market by the market-clearing condition 








= 0 = 𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥), (16) 
where 𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥) implicitly defines the lender 
fee 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)  and the borrower fee 
𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥).  Based on this market-clearing 
condition, Lemma 8 explains how aggregate demand 
and supply simultaneously change as a result of 
changes in the external factors, and the platform fees. 
Lemma 8: Aggregate demand increases and 
aggregate supply decreases in the lender fee and 
purchase price. Aggregate supply increases and 
aggregate demand decreases in the borrower fee, 
the sharing price, and capacity. 
Proof: Totally differentiating (16) with respect to 
𝒑𝒑𝑺𝑺, 𝒔𝒔𝑩𝑩, 𝒔𝒔𝑳𝑳, 𝒑𝒑𝑷𝑷, and 𝒙𝒙�, we have 















−𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿,, ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
= 





















𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿










𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃
= 
−𝑦𝑦�𝜃𝜃�, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿,, ?̅?𝑥� ∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃�(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃








𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦(𝜃𝜃, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , ?̅?𝑥)
𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑥










From the borrowers’ individual elasticities of 
demand explained in Lemma 1, the lenders’ 
individual elasticities of supply explained in 
Lemma 4, and the changes in the number of lenders 
and borrowers explained in Lemma 5 we get the 
signs of the five equations above. Q.E.D. 
The first equation represents the effect of the sharing 
price on aggregate demand and supply. A marginal 
increase of the sharing price decreases the demand of 
borrowers and increases the supply of lenders. These 
effects are represented by the first two terms. 
Moreover, the supply increases and the demand 
decreases from a shift of the indifferent consumer. This 
effect is represented by the last two terms. Overall, a 
marginal increase of the sharing price leads to a greater 
aggregate supply than demand. 
The second equation represents the effect of the 
borrower fee on aggregated demand and supply. A 
marginal increase of the borrower fee decreases the 
demand of all borrowers represented by the first term 
and has no effect on the supply of lenders. Moreover, 
the supply increases and the demand decreases from a 
shift of the indifferent consumer. This effect is 
represented by the last two terms. Overall, a marginal 
increase of the borrower fee leads to a greater 
aggregate supply than demand. 
The third equation represents the effect of the lender 
fee on aggregated demand and supply. A marginal 
increase of the lender fee decreases the supply of 
lenders represented by the first term and has no effect 
on the demand of borrowers. Moreover, the supply 
decreases and the demand increases from a shift of the 
indifferent consumer. This effect is represented by the last 
two terms. Overall, a marginal increase of the lender fee 
leads to a greater aggregate demand than supply. 
The fourth equation represents the effect of the 
purchase price on aggregated demand and supply. 
The only effect from a marginal increase of the 
purchase price is a shift of the indifferent consumer 
resulting in an increasing aggregate demand and a 
decreasing aggregate supply. 
The last equation represents the effect of capacity on 
aggregated demand and supply. A marginal increase in 
capacity increases the supply of all lenders represented by 
the first term and has no effect on the demand of all 
borrowers. Moreover, the supply increases and the demand 
decreases from a shift of the indifferent consumer. This 
effect is represented by the last two terms. Overall, a 
marginal increase in capacity leads to a greater aggregate 
supply than demand. 
Consequently, isolated changes in the external factors 
and the platform fees result in a violation of the 
market-clearing condition described in (16). To 
maintain the market-clearing condition, the sharing 
platform has to adapt its platform fees in response to 
the effects explained in Lemma 8. Theorem 2 defines 
the comparative statics of the platform fees as a result 
of changes in the external factors and of changes in the 
complement platform fee: 
Theorem 2. The lender fee is increasing with the 
sharing price, is increasing with the borrower 
fee, is increasing with capacity, and is decreasing 
with the purchase price. The borrower fee is 
increasing with the purchase price, is increasing 
with the lender fee, is decreasing with the 
sharing price, and is decreasing with capacity. 
Proof: From Lemma 8 and the implicit function rule, 




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵





𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿
> 0, 




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
> 0, 






𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 , 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵




𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝜖𝜖(𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 , 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 , 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃 , ?̅?𝑥)/𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵
< 0. 
Q.E.D. 
The comparative statics of the lender and borrower fees 
to each other are positive, indicating that these fees are 
strategic complements. This is because a reduction in 
one requires a reduction in the other in order to maintain 
the market-clearing condition, and vice versa. For given 
external factors, the comparative statics of the lender 
and borrower fees can be used to change their absolute 
level. This is required if platform profits can be 
increased through changing the absolute level of the 
platform fees. The profit maximizing level of the 
platform fees depends on the relative magnitudes of the 
platform fee elasticities of demand explained in Lemma 
1, the platform fee elasticities of supply explained in 
Lemma 4, and the effects of changing platform fees on 
the number of lenders and borrowers explained in 
Lemma 5. 
Moreover, the comparative statics show that in order 
to remain profit maximizing and maintain the market-
clearing condition, a monopoly sharing platform must 
adapt its platform fees in response to changes in 
purchase price, sharing price, and capacity of a durable 
good as follows: the lender fee has to be increased or 
the borrower fee has to be decreased with an increasing 
sharing price, an increasing capacity, and a decreasing 
purchase price of a durable good and, vice versa. 
Whether to adapt the lender fee or the borrower fee 
depends on the relative magnitude of the external 
factor elasticities of demand explained in Lemma 1, 
the external factor elasticities of supply explained in 
Lemma 4, and the effects of changing external factors 
on the number of lenders and borrowers explained in 
Lemma 5. 
5 Conclusion and Discussion 
Rifkin (2000) predicted in the year 2000 that 
“ownership is steadily being replaced by access.” A 
couple of years later several sharing platforms such as 
zilok.com emerged. These sharing platforms aim to 
maximize profits and need to understand how to 
optimally price lenders and borrowers in response to 
changes in external factors, such as the sharing price, 
purchase price, and capacity of a good. 
We find that sharing platforms maximize profits only 
if the supplied usage time of a durable good provided by 
lenders through a sharing platform matches the demanded 
usage time requested by borrowers—that is, the market 
must clear for platform fees to be profit maximizing. We 
further find that the market-clearing condition requires 
lender and borrower fees are classic strategic complements, 
and we show how sharing platforms have to adapt their 
platform fees in response to a changing sharing price, 
purchase price, and durability. 
Most pricing models of existing sharing platforms 
have not implemented pricing models in which 
platform fees dynamically change for the same durable 
good in response to external factors. Although in a 
different setting, an exception is uber.com, which 
dynamically adapts the sharing price in response to 
changing demand and supply in the sharing of 
transportation services. The major difference between 
uber.com and the sharing platforms for durable goods that 
we study—aside from features of the setting (i.e., on 
uber.com participation in market sides is predetermined, 
capacity is flexible, etc.)—is that uber.com not only decides 
on the platform fees but also on the sharing price. 
Sharing platforms for durable goods can only set the 
platform fees (i.e., the lender determines the sharing 
price). The vast majority of sharing platforms such as 
aszilok.com only charge a percent-of-value lender fee, 
representing a percentage rate of the total sharing price, 
and do not charge borrowers. Our model results 
indicate that such a percent-of-value lender fee may be 
a valid pricing model for lenders as long as the sharing 
platform is able to clear the market by using this 
mechanism. However, if the demand for sharing a 
durable good is higher than supply, then even with a 
very low lender fee, raising a borrower fee can become 
necessary to fulfill the market-clearing condition and 
to maximize profits. In our model, we found that such 
a borrower fee must be reduced if the sharing price 
increases in order to maintain the market-clearing 
condition. Subsequently, a percent-of-value borrower 
fee (e.g. charged by airbnb.com) cannot continuously 
maximize profits. These findings indicate that 
commonly applied one-sided pricing models of sharing 
platforms can be improved. 
Because not all factors that influence platform fees can 
be continuously observed, sharing platforms may 
implement the relationships defined in our Lemmas and 
Theorems as rule-based pricing mechanisms (cf., Bădică, 
Bădită, & Ganzha, 2006). In this way, sharing platforms 
can ensure that the platform fees are adapted in an 
automated way in response to changes of, for example, 
the sharing or purchase price of a durable good, and may 
dynamically maximize their profits. 
Although there are benefits from analyzing 
platform pricing in a general analytical model—
specifically the wide range to which the results 
apply—there are still some limitations that 
represent starting points for future research. 
Nonnegative platform fees: In our model we assume 
nonnegative platform fees (𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆]; 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∈
[0, 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃];  𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 + 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ∈  𝑅𝑅+).  We made this assumption 
because sustainable business models of sharing 
platforms require positive fees to cover fixed costs and 
we do not observe negative fees charged by operating 




sharing platforms in practice. However, especially for 
new start-ups, it may be the case that supply for 
sharing a durable good is zero or very low while 
demand is very high. In this case, to encourage 
supply on the sharing platform, it may be profit 
maximizing (at least in the short run) to subsidize 
lenders by a negative fee. To analyze if and how 
our findings change in the case of negative 
platform fees would likely require a diffusion 
model and is a task for future research. 
Nonlinear platform fees: We implicitly assume the 
transaction-based platform fees linearly increase in the 
shared usage time of a durable good. However, there 
are pricing models in which the marginal platform fees 
decrease in the shared usage time (e.g., zilok.com 
charges a lender fee which decreases from 9% to 5% 
in the shared usage time of a durable good). To analyze 
the effects of different nonlinear pricing models, our 
model would have to be extended by reduced-form 
functions for the platform fees. 
Fixed platform fees: If the platform fees take the form 
of a membership (or fixed) fee that can differ between 
the membership fee charged to borrows and lenders, the 
difference in these fees would be an argument to the 
function which defines the consumer that is indifferent 
between borrowing and lending. Consequently, the 
difference in membership fees could be used by the 
sharing platform as a means with which to control the 
number of borrowers and lenders. The membership fees 
could also be used to make additional profit from 
consumers if the consumer need for the durable good 
were sufficiently large. 
Externalities: Sharing durable goods can have positive 
externalities (e.g., lowering environmental damage, 
fostering communities), and negative externalities 
(e.g., downturn in demand for buying durable goods, 
decreasing revenues for traditional firms). A possible 
extension of our model would be the incorporation of 
such externalities and the analysis of their impact on 
our findings. 
Welfare and policy: A further direction for future 
research is to extend our model to include welfare 
analysis. This is of special interest, since existing 
literature has not yet reached a consensus on the impact 
of the sharing economy on producer surplus. For 
instance, Zervas et al. (2014) empirically found that 
airbnb.com successfully competes with established 
firms in the hospitality industry, leading to decreasing 
hotel revenues. In contrast, Jiang and Tian (2015) 
highlight that consumers have higher reservation 
prices for durable goods because they anticipate 
additional revenues from sharing. Consequently, 
manufacturers of durable goods may benefit from 
sharing, as they can charge higher purchase prices. 
Moreover, the impact of the sharing economy on 
overall welfare, including consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, and different externalities is unclear. There is 
also a lack of policy frameworks for regulating the new 
sharing economy (Dervojeda et al., 2013). Against this 
backdrop, another interesting direction for further 
research would be analyzing different policy measures 
for the C2C sharing market and their impact on social 
welfare. 
B2C business models: Beside the C2C sharing business 
model analyzed in this research, B2C sharing is 
another business model that is commonly applied in 
the sharing economy. In our current C2C model, 
consumers decide to purchase and share (i.e., be a 
lender) or borrow (i.e., be a borrower) a homogeneous 
durable good based on the utilities they expect from the 
two options. In contrast, in a B2C model, lenders and 
borrowers are mutually exclusive groups—lenders are 
firms that maximize profits, while borrowers are 
consumers who maximize utility. As this represents a 
substantially different model setup, in future research 
we aim to analyze whether our findings also hold in a 
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